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Philosophy and T heology
Given the increasing desire for life-saving transplantation, proposals aiming 
to bridge the gap between supply and demand o f donated organs continue to be 
circulated. “The greatly enhanced technical ability to transplant organs has also led 
to an ever-increasing need for transplantable organs. The explosive growth in the 
demand for and the marginal increase in the supply o f transplantable organs have 
together been characterized as an ‘evolving national health care crisis.’” 1 In the 
United States alone, approximately one hundred thousand patients are on transplant 
waiting lists, but each year only ten to tw enty thousand receive organs (Thomas 
D. Harter, “Overcoming the Organ Shortage: Failing Means and Radical Reform,” 
H EC  Forum, June 2008).
One way in which this gap could be narrowed is by making more use o f organ 
donation after cardiac death (DCD). “M any patients in the intensive care unit will 
die o f these very same neurological diagnoses but never satisfy criteria for brain 
stem death. It is by utilizing this new population o f potential donors that NHBD 
[non-heart-beating-donation] may substantially increase the organ donor pool.”1 2 
M. D. Bell estimates that the organ pool could be increased by 25 percent through 
DCD, a possibility which generates considerable pressure to increase DCD.3 As J. L. 
Verheijde, M. Y. Rady, and J. M cGregor note, a “federal m andate requires hospitals 
as o f January 2007 to design policies and procedures for organ procurem ent in DCD
1 J. L. Verheijde, M. Y. Rady, and J. McGregor, “Recovery of Transplantable Organs 
after Cardiac or Circulatory Death: Transforming the Paradigm for the Ethics of Organ 
Donation,” Philosophy, Ethics and Humanities in Medicine 2.8 (May 2007): 1.
2 D. Gardiner and B. Riley, “Non-Heart-Beating Organ Donation: Solution or a Step 
Too Far?” Anaesthesia 62.5 (May 2007): 431.
3 See M. D. Bell, “Non-Heart Beating Organ Donation: Old Procurement Strategy— 
New Ethical Problems,” Journal o f Medical Ethics 29.3 (June 2003): 177.
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to increase the rate o f organ donation and recovery from decedents to 75 percent 
or greater.” 4
Concerns about whether neurological criteria can properly define death also 
drive interest in DCD as an alternative to transplantation following brain death 
(see D. A lan Shewmon, “Brain Death: Can It Be Resuscitated?” Hastings Center 
Report, M arch-A pril 2009). The early years o f organ transplantation made use o f 
cardiopulmonary criteria in determ ining death. Following the 1968 Harvard M edi­
cal School Ad Hoc Committee report, death began to be defined in term s o f loss o f 
brain function, either whole brain or even just higher-brain function. Even though 
in current practice the majority o f transplantation comes from donors declared dead 
by the use o f neurological criteria, organ donation still takes place through the ap­
plication o f cardiopulmonary (circulatory-respiratory) criteria in determ ining death. 
However, i f  we are to retain the dead-donor rule and i f  the critics o f brain death are 
correct, then the use o f circulatory-respiratory criteria to determine death becomes 
not ju st a possibility but a necessity for organ donation purposes. (For a critique o f 
brain-death criteria, see Franklin G. M iller and Robert D. Truog, “The Incoherence 
o f Determ ining Death by Neurological Criteria: A  Commentary on Controversies in 
the Determination o f  Death, a W hite Paper by the President’s Council on Bioethics,” 
Kennedy Institute o f  Ethics Journal, June 2009.)
Unfortunately, three sorts o f ethical questions have been raised about DCD 
itself. First, is there a necessary conflict o f  interest between providing optimal care 
for the patient donating organs and looking to benefit the organ recipient? Second, 
is it permissible to alter care for the donor prior to death solely for the sake o f the 
organ recipient or are such interventions in violation o f the m axim  always to respect 
hum anity as an end in itself and never use any person simply as a means? Third, at 
what point can we declare death by m eans o f circulatory-respiratory criteria?
The first question is whether there is a necessary conflict o f  interest in DCD 
between providing the best care for the organ donor and looking after the interests 
o f the organ recipient. The potential for conflict is certainly possible, since a physi­
cian may neglect to properly care for, or even kill, one patient in order to get viable 
organs for another patient. Transplantation practices in Sweden m ay provide a 
model for resolving potential conflicts o f interest. (See K. Zeiler et al., “The Ethics 
o f Non-Heart-Beating Donation: How New Technology Can Change the Ethical 
Landscape,” Journal o f  M edical Ethics, July 2008.)5 In Sweden, medical profes­
sionals are strictly forbidden from asking about or discussing the donor status o f a 
patient (whether pro or con) during the course o f treatment. A fter death is declared, 
the health care team  checks the national registry for advance directives to find out 
whether the patient consented to organ donation. This way o f proceeding avoids
4Verheijde, Rady, and McGregor, “Recovery of Transplantable Organs,” 2.
5 In the Swedish approach, the individual decision whether or not to be an organ donor 
takes precedence, but in cases in which there is no directive either for or against donation, 
the presumption is that the person would consent to organ donation and donation is done 
unless the family objects.
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conflicts between providing the best care for the dying patient and looking to secure 
organs for needy organ recipients. Since the donor status o f a patient is unknown 
prior to death, physicians and others have no incentive to provide less than optimal 
care for donors. A physician in such a case simply does not know whether the patient 
is a potential organ donor, so considerations about benefiting a potential recipient 
cannot cloud the physician’s judgment.
A second question relevant for DCD concerns antemortem interventions. In 
the case o f antemortem interventions, the patient is still alive but is given treatments 
in order to prepare his organs for transplantation to benefit the organ recipient. Is 
it ethically permissible to perform  procedures on the donor while the donor is still 
alive solely for the sake o f the organ recipient? Such inventions are possible only in 
controlled DCD, for in uncontrolled cases o f DCD the patient has already died. The 
ethical concern with antemortem interventions is that it is morally wrong for one 
person (the donor) to be used simply as a means to aid another person (the organ 
recipient). DCD would seem to violate the widely held maxim that humanity, whether 
in one’s own person or in another, is always to be respected as an end in itself and 
never used simply as a means. I f  DCD is permitted, basic treatment needed to sustain 
life m ay be withdrawn, simply to secure more organs.6 Nancy Valko suggests that 
the patients may be pressured into “pulling the plug” so as to make themselves use­
ful as sources o f organ donation. There is an apparent conflict between implement­
ing the Swedish protocol ju st described and doing any antemortem interventions 
whatsoever. However, i f  we m odify the Swedish Transplantation Act to say that no 
inquiry may be made into donor status until the patient has died or the patient has 
decided to remove life-sustaining treatment, this difficulty is avoided, as are Valko’s 
concerns o f Valko. However, in cultural contexts such as our own, in which the basic 
hum an dignity o f all hum an beings is frequently denied, this concern— that DCD 
dehumanizes patients in their final hours— are serious.
These concerns are amplified by the views o f some (but not all) advocates of 
DCD. For example, James F. Childress considers such people “better o ff dead than 
alive with severe pain and discomfort.”7 Childress’s view is undifferentiated. Severe 
pain and discom fort are evils— evils that exist only in living beings. However, it 
does not follow from this that life itself is evil, or that people in severe pain would 
be better o ff dead. Life is an intrinsic good, because bodily life is a constitutive 
element o f what it is to be a hum an being, and to be a hum an being is always good. 
Similarly, knowledge o f a painful truth causes suffering and hardship, but it does not 
follow that people would be “better o ff without intelligence” or that intelligence itself 
is sometimes an evil, even though it is true that in elim inating hum an intelligence 
certain kinds o f suffering would thereby also eliminated. Human life is good, it is not
6 See Nancy Valko, “Ethical Implications of Non-Heart-Beating Organ Donation,” 
Human Life Review 28.3 (Fall 2002): 109.
Jam es F. Childress, “Non-Heart-Beating Donors of Organs: Are the Distinctions 
between Direct and Indirect Effects and between Killing and Letting Die Relevant and 
Helpful?” Kennedy Institute o f  Ethics Journal 3.2 (June 1993): 204.
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an evil or not worth living, even though hum an life is a necessary condition for pain 
and suffering, and even though in some cases the burdens o f some life-sustaining 
treatm ent outweigh its benefits.
Childress wonders whether a patient may turn  down treatm ent in order to aid 
an organ recipient. “One unresolved question is whether altruistic patients who want 
to increase the chances that their deaths will produce usable organs may choose to 
alter the care provided in the last few hours o f their lives.”8 However, in medical 
practice, a competent patient may always to refuse medical treatments. Therefore, if  
a competent patient chooses to discontinue or refuse a treatm ent that in the patient’s 
view was not worthwhile, in order to help an organ recipient, this is not prim a facie 
legally or ethically problematic. To refuse continued life-sustaining treatm ent is not 
morally wrong so long as it is not chosen precisely as a m eans to suicide.
Zeiler and colleagues argue that a patient should be treated only for his or her 
own sake; therefore the use o f anticoagulants and other drugs for the sake o f the 
person receiving the donation is prohibited. However, presuming informed consent, 
neither forgoing treatm ent judged burdensome by the patient nor taking on bodily 
risks for the sake o f benefiting someone else violates the Kantian maxim o f respecting 
all persons, including oneself, as ends in themselves and never using them  simply 
as a means. In the case o f kidney donation, for example, the donor freely chooses to 
undergo risks o f various kinds— including surgery and future reliance on a single 
kidney— in order to aid another person, yet because this sacrifice for the good o f 
another is freely chosen, it embodies rather than undermines innate hum an dignity. 
Using a person simply as a means treats the hum an person as a mere tool or biological 
material to be manipulated, but in giving free consent the donor acts as an autono­
mous person. O f course, not every autonomously chosen action is compatible with 
proper self-regard. For example, suicide com m itted to provide organs for another is 
morally impermissible, for it is m aking use o f oneself simply as a means as i f  every 
innocent hum an life were not inviolable. However, risking one’s own well-being 
to help another is heroically generous. By contrast, commiting suicide in order to 
give non-duplicate vital organs to another violates the principle that every innocent 
person, including oneself, should not be intentionally killed.
But perhaps precisely this principle can be used to argue against antemortem 
interventions in DCD cases. I f  one m ay not intentionally kill or hasten death, even 
to aid another person, then i f  DCD necessarily involved either, it would be wrong. 
In uncontrolled cases o f DCD, these issues are not relevant, since it is impossible 
to kill, or hasten the death of, an already dead patient. However, in controlled DCD 
cases, one could argue that removal o f life support is intentional killing or intentional 
hastening o f death.
The removal o f life support may indeed, in some cases, violate the sanctity o f 
life, but it need not in all cases be intentional killing. I f  the removal o f life support 
is simply the m eans chosen to kill the patient, it would indeed be wrong and simply 
a form o f euthanasia. However, if  the life-supporting treatm ent is removed because
8Ibid., 210.
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the treatment, not the patient, is judged more burdensome than beneficial, then such 
removal is moral. Removal o f life support in such cases does not involve a homicidal 
intent, even i f  it is certain the patient w ill die. I f  removing life support even in cases 
where death will certainly follow can be permissible, how much more is the adm in­
istration o f antemortem interventions, which may only risk hastening death perm is­
sible. Typical antemortem interventions in DCD cases include the adm inistration o f 
heparin or phentolamine, and cannulation. I could find no conclusive evidence that 
these interventions necessarily hasten death in potential non-heart-beating donors. 
However, m any authors point to the risks o f such interventions, perhaps even lethal 
risks.9
Assum ing that antemortem interventions risk death, they may still be justified 
by double-effect reasoning. First, it is not intrinsically evil to do an action that risks 
death, including fighting fires, serving in the military, or taking a potentially lethal 
medication to preserve life or health. Second, if  death comes about, the death in the 
DCD case is not a m eans to the end o f helping the organ recipient, since the hastened 
death is not what makes the organs suitable for transplantation. True, the patient 
m ust be dead i f  the dead-donor rule is to be respected, but the tim ing o f the death 
is not norm ally essential to the organ donation. In other words, i f  the organ donor 
dies a few minutes sooner rather than a later, this tim ing o f death is not a m eans to 
the organ donation but a side-effect o f preparing the organs for donation. Third, the 
evil o f hastened death is not intended as either a means or an end in itself. In other 
words, the physician is not necessarily seeking, endeavoring, or w illing the early 
death o f the patient so as to facilitate organ transplantation. Again, the tim ing o f the 
death o f the donor is not relevant for successful organ transplantation. Finally, there 
exists a serious reason for allowing the possible evil effect, namely, saving the life 
o f the organ recipient.
Steinberg objects that “the principle o f double effect can be manipulated because 
the notion o f what it intended is both malleable and subject to the whims o f human 
consciousness. The same act may be permissible or impermissible depending on 
what enters a physician’s consciousness.” 10 *In other words, double-effect reasoning 
leads to ethical doublethink, in which what is wrong is made right simply by power 
o f mind.
Steinberg’s objection does not adequately capture double-effect reasoning 
properly understood.11 I f  an agent literally is unaware o f an aspect o f  an action, if  
this effect is not at all a part o f  the agent’s plan or even consciousness, then the agent
9 See Bell, “Non-Heart Beating Organ Donation,” 179; and David Steinberg, “The 
Antemortem Use of Heparin in Non-Heartbeating Organ Transplantation: A Justification 
Based on the Paradigm of Altruism “ Journal o f  Clinical Ethics 14.1-2 (Spring-Summer 
2003): 19.
10 Steinberg, “Antemortem Use of Heparin,” 20.
“ Perhaps the best single resource for this understanding is Thomas Cavanaugh, 
Double-Effect Reasoning: Doing Good and Avoiding Evil (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2006).
779
The N ational Catholic B ioethics Quarterly +  W inter 2009
is ignorant o f that effect. Ignorance, o f course, comes in two varieties— culpable 
and inculpable. I f  the agent is inculpably ignorant o f  an evil effect, then no moral 
guilt is incurred and the action as perform ed by the agent is not morally defined by 
that effect. I f  the agent is culpably ignorant, then the agent is ethically responsible 
for what occurs, for the agent could have and should have been aware o f the effect. 
However, what is intended or not intended does not shift simply as a result o f  one’s 
mental focus. W hat is knowingly chosen as a m eans to an end or as an end in itself 
is always intended— regardless o f what narrative the agent constructs to somehow 
transform  a m eans into a side-effect, regardless o f which effects the agent was 
“focusing” on in consciousness, regardless o f whether the agent regrets or delights in 
the given effect. W hat an agent intends corresponds to the actual m eans and actual 
ends chosen as a part o f  agent’s practical reasoning.
A third question facing controlled DCD is, when does irreversible loss o f car­
diopulmonary function take place? No single, universally accepted standard exists 
for the determ ination o f death by cardiac criteria. Patients are declared dead in less 
than two minutes o f asystole (cardiac standstill) in many intensive care units. The 
Pittsburgh protocol for DCD insists on two minutes; the Institute o f Medicine five 
minutes, and the M aastricht protocol ten minutes. The foremost critic o f  brain death, 
D. A lan Shewmon, believes that norm ally the “point o f  no return” is twenty to th irty  
minutes following loss o f circulation.12
If  we adopt the most demanding standard, tw enty to th irty  minutes, then we 
have greater assurance o f not violating the dead-donor rule. Adopting this standard 
may also increase the likelihood o f public confidence that transplantation itself does 
not kill donors, a perception that m ay increase the num ber o f people who are willing 
to be donors. By contrast, less demanding standards may increase public perception 
that organ transplantation kills one person to aid another, driving down the number 
o f w illing donors and further exacerbating the organ shortage.
Is the demanding standard o f twenty to th irty  minutes compatible with retriev­
ing viable organs for donation? DCD most often involves the donation o f kidneys and 
livers.13 Fortunately, these organs remain viable for donation, “up to forty minutes 
after cessation o f heartbeat. (Kidneys and livers are more resilient to oxygen depriva­
tion than other organs).” 14 DCD can also be used for lung transplantation: “The gas 
exchange system o f the lungs can tolerate one hour o f warm ischemia after circulatory 
arrest without significant loss o f functional capacity.” 15 W hat about DCD for heart
12 See D. Alan Shewmon, “Brainstem Death, Brain Death, and Death: A Critical 
Re-Evaluation,” Issues in Law & Medicine 14.2 (Fall 1998).
13 See Roger Herdman, Thomas L. Beauchamp, and John T. Potts, “The Institute of 
Medicine’s Report on Non-Heart-Beating Organ Transplantation,” Kennedy Institute o f  
Ethics Journal 8.1 (March 1998): 86.
14Phyllis L. Grasser, “Donation after Cardiac Death: Major Ethical Issues,” National 
Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 7.3 (Autumn 2007): 541.
15 Axel Carlberg, “Transplanting Lungs from Non-Heart-Beating Donors,” National 
Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 2.3 (Autumn 2002): 378.
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transplantation? “Recently the Papworth hospital group described the first case o f 
functional recovery in a hum an deceased donor heart following in-vivo perfusion of 
the coronary circulation with norm otherm ic blood using an extracorporeal circuit. 
A fter twenty-three minutes o f warm  ischemia the asystolic heart was perfused and 
reverted into sinus rhythm.” 16 Even with the demanding standard, livers, kidneys, 
lungs, and perhaps even hearts can be retrieved in cases o f DCD.
This raises a problem, for i f  kidneys, livers, lungs, and maybe also hearts are 
all still viable for transplantation after twenty to th irty  m inutes o f asystole, then the 
patient would seem to be still alive. In taking the patient’s vital organs, we violate the 
dead-donor rule. However, i f  we wait until an hour or two passes, then the patient is 
certainly dead but the organs commonly retrieved in DCD are not longer viable.
This is a false dilemma. The fact that an organ or even many organs may 
function well in a donor’s body does not m ean that the organ donor is not yet dead. 
Life consists not in having various organs that can function outside the context o f 
the organism, but rather in the integrated functioning o f the organism as a whole. 
Imagine a special disintegrating m achine that destroyed every cell in the hum an 
body except for the liver, lungs, heart, and kidneys. A  hum an being disintegrated 
in such m anner is obviously dead, but the organs are nevertheless viable. In a less 
imaginative example, a hum an being is no longer alive shortly following decapita­
tion, but the organs o f such a person may very well remain viable for transplantation. 
Organic life consists not in possessing organs that can function in other contexts, 
but rather in being an organism with integrally functioning organs.
In this essay, I have attempted to briefly answer three m ain ethical questions 
arising from DCD. These include concerns about a conflict o f interest between 
providing the best treatm ent for potential donors and facilitating organ transplanta­
tion, worries about the use o f antemortem drugs to facilitate organ transplantation, 
and uncertainties about determ ining death by m eans o f cardiopulmonary criteria. 
These reasonable concerns should give pause to advocates o f DCD, but the ethical 
difficulties appear to be surmountable. Properly carried out, DCD is, in my view, 
ethically permissible even i f  it remains from a medical point o f  view technically 
difficult to successfully perform.
Christopher K aczor, Ph .D. 
Loyola M arym ount University 
Los Angeles, California
16 Ashley Laboratory, “Deceased Donor as a Source for Organs for Heart Transplanta­
tion” (2009), Stanford University School of Medicine, http://ashleylab.stanford.edu/projects/ 
physclin/non_heart_beat_donor.html.
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